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CVE-2026-43194
HIGH · CVSS 7.5 · Modified
Published: 2026-05-06 · Updated: 2026-11-11 · Source: NVD
Stored catalog record
Source record retrieved 2026-11-11T22:14:02.730359+00:00. Scheduled imports handle updates; this page does not assert that the provider was queried just now.
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Vulnerability overview
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: consume xmit errors of GSO frames udpgro_frglist.sh and udpgro_bench.sh are the flakiest tests currently in NIPA. They fail in the same exact way, TCP GRO test stalls occasionally and the test gets killed after 10min. These tests use veth to simulate GRO. They attach a trivial ("return XDP_PASS;") XDP program to the veth to force TSO off and NAPI on. Digging into the failure mode we can see that the connection is completely stuck after a burst of drops. The sender's snd_nxt is at sequence number N [1], but the receiver claims to have received (rcv_nxt) up to N + 3 * MSS [2]. Last piece of the puzzle is that senders rtx queue is not empty (let's say the block in the rtx queue is at sequence number N - 4 * MSS [3]). In this state, sender sends a retransmission from the rtx queue with a single segment, and sequence numbers N-4*MSS:N-3*MSS [3]. Receiver sees it and responds with an ACK all the way up to N + 3 * MSS [2]. But sender will reject this ack as TCP_ACK_UNSENT_DATA because it has no recollection of ever sending data that far out [1]. And we are stuck. The root cause is the mess of the xmit return codes. veth returns an error when it can't xmit a frame. We end up with a loss event like this: ------------------------------------------------- | GSO super frame 1 | GSO super frame 2 | |-----------------------------------------------| | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | seg | | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 | 7 | 8 | ------------------------------------------------- x ok ok <ok>| ok ok ok <x> \\ snd_nxt "x" means packet lost by veth, and "ok" means it went thru. Since veth has TSO disabled in this test it sees individual segments. Segment 1 is on the retransmit queue and will be resent. So why did the sender not advance snd_nxt even tho it clearly did send up to seg 8? tcp_write_xmit() interprets the return code from the core to mean that data has not been sent at all. Since TCP deals with GSO super frames, not individual segment the crux of the problem is that loss of a single segment can be interpreted as loss of all. TCP only sees the last return code for the last segment of the GSO frame (in <> brackets in the diagram above). Of course for the problem to occur we need a setup or a device without a Qdisc. Otherwise Qdisc layer disconnects the protocol layer from the device errors completely. We have multiple ways to fix this. 1) make veth not return an error when it lost a packet. While this is what I think we did in the past, the issue keeps reappearing and it's annoying to debug. The game of whack a mole is not great. 2) fix the damn return codes We only talk about NETDEV_TX_OK and NETDEV_TX_BUSY in the documentation, so maybe we should make the return code from ndo_start_xmit() a boolean. I like that the most, but perhaps some ancient, not-really-networking protocol would suffer. 3) make TCP ignore the errors It is not entirely clear to me what benefit TCP gets from interpreting the result of ip_queue_xmit()? Specifically once the connection is established and we're pushing data - packet loss is just packet loss? 4) this fix Ignore the rc in the Qdisc-less+GSO case, since it's unreliable. We already always return OK in the TCQ_F_CAN_BYPASS case. In the Qdisc-less case let's be a bit more conservative and only mask the GSO errors. This path is taken by non-IP-"networks" like CAN, MCTP etc, so we could regress some ancient thing. This is the simplest, but also maybe the hackiest fix? Similar fix has been proposed by Eric in the past but never committed because original reporter was working with an OOT driver and wasn't providing feedback (see Link).
Patch review priority
Assess exposure and vendor guidance
- No higher-priority signal is available in the current stored evidence.
FIRST EPSS: 0.53% · percentile 45.7 · score date 2026-11-18.
EPSS estimates probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. It does not measure your exposure or prove exploitation. The elevated threshold is 10%; CISA KEV takes precedence. About FIRST EPSS ↗
Severity and scoring
- CVSS score
- 7.5 · HIGH
- CVSS version
- 3.1
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
- Weaknesses
- CWE-754, NVD-CWE-noinfo
CVSS measures technical severity; it does not establish whether this vulnerability is being exploited in your environment.
Known exploitation and remediation
Not listed in the CISA catalog retrieved for this record. This does not establish that exploitation has not occurred.
Verify affected versions and patch availability in the vendor advisory before making changes.
Affected products and versions
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
From (inclusive): 3.18
Before (exclusive): 5.10.252
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
From (inclusive): 5.11
Before (exclusive): 5.15.202
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
From (inclusive): 5.16
Before (exclusive): 6.1.165
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
From (inclusive): 6.2
Before (exclusive): 6.6.128
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
From (inclusive): 6.7
Before (exclusive): 6.12.75
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
From (inclusive): 6.13
Before (exclusive): 6.18.16
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
From (inclusive): 6.19
Before (exclusive): 6.19.6
cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*
These are NVD CPE applicability entries. Some products depend on configuration conditions; consult the official record to confirm applicability.
Advisories and references
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c9de092ef8c50a7ee9612811566f0aa81d8d7b6
Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4cb163e9efcac4cd35c3043e097f25081a5c015c
Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/56bd32c0edca34041a5c215887fcf562fae2e2db
Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/7aa767d0d3d04e50ae94e770db7db8197f666970
Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/9ac6aebef4b4bfc5ed408b0b65645981574bc780
Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ae3f627b45fbc3c776a4e484696f3cad7cbb4eca
Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c86901d22c89a6bf4e2f013e948aaabc60869893
Patch
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/ea5d7787635e26ec1194ec7eec0e8e5ae3bd10a5
Patch