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CVE-2026-43472

MEDIUM · CVSS 5.5 · Analyzed

Published: 2026-05-08 · Updated: 2026-11-11 · Source: NVD

Stored catalog record

Source record retrieved 2026-11-11T22:15:02.963132+00:00. Scheduled imports handle updates; this page does not assert that the provider was queried just now.

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Vulnerability overview

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: unshare: fix unshare_fs() handling There's an unpleasant corner case in unshare(2), when we have a CLONE_NEWNS in flags and current->fs hadn't been shared at all; in that case copy_mnt_ns() gets passed current->fs instead of a private copy, which causes interesting warts in proof of correctness] > I guess if private means fs->users == 1, the condition could still be true. Unfortunately, it's worse than just a convoluted proof of correctness. Consider the case when we have CLONE_NEWCGROUP in addition to CLONE_NEWNS (and current->fs->users == 1). We pass current->fs to copy_mnt_ns(), all right. Suppose it succeeds and flips current->fs->{pwd,root} to corresponding locations in the new namespace. Now we proceed to copy_cgroup_ns(), which fails (e.g. with -ENOMEM). We call put_mnt_ns() on the namespace created by copy_mnt_ns(), it's destroyed and its mount tree is dissolved, but... current->fs->root and current->fs->pwd are both left pointing to now detached mounts. They are pinning those, so it's not a UAF, but it leaves the calling process with unshare(2) failing with -ENOMEM _and_ leaving it with pwd and root on detached isolated mounts. The last part is clearly a bug. There is other fun related to that mess (races with pivot_root(), including the one between pivot_root() and fork(), of all things), but this one is easy to isolate and fix - treat CLONE_NEWNS as "allocate a new fs_struct even if it hadn't been shared in the first place". Sure, we could go for something like "if both CLONE_NEWNS *and* one of the things that might end up failing after copy_mnt_ns() call in create_new_namespaces() are set, force allocation of new fs_struct", but let's keep it simple - the cost of copy_fs_struct() is trivial. Another benefit is that copy_mnt_ns() with CLONE_NEWNS *always* gets a freshly allocated fs_struct, yet to be attached to anything. That seriously simplifies the analysis... FWIW, that bug had been there since the introduction of unshare(2) ;-/

Patch review priority

Assess exposure and vendor guidance

  • No higher-priority signal is available in the current stored evidence.

FIRST EPSS: 0.11% · percentile 1.5 · score date 2026-11-18.

EPSS estimates probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. It does not measure your exposure or prove exploitation. The elevated threshold is 10%; CISA KEV takes precedence. About FIRST EPSS ↗

Severity and scoring

CVSS score
5.5 · MEDIUM
CVSS version
3.1
CVSS vector
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H
Weaknesses
CWE-908

CVSS measures technical severity; it does not establish whether this vulnerability is being exploited in your environment.

Known exploitation and remediation

Not listed in the CISA catalog retrieved for this record. This does not establish that exploitation has not occurred.

Verify affected versions and patch availability in the vendor advisory before making changes.

Affected products and versions

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

    From (inclusive): 2.6.16.1

    Before (exclusive): 5.10.253

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

    From (inclusive): 5.11

    Before (exclusive): 5.15.203

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

    From (inclusive): 5.16

    Before (exclusive): 6.1.167

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

    From (inclusive): 6.2

    Before (exclusive): 6.6.130

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

    From (inclusive): 6.7

    Before (exclusive): 6.12.78

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

    From (inclusive): 6.13

    Before (exclusive): 6.18.19

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*

    From (inclusive): 6.19

    Before (exclusive): 6.19.9

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.16:-:*:*:*:*:*:*

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.16:rc3:*:*:*:*:*:*

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.16:rc4:*:*:*:*:*:*

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.16:rc5:*:*:*:*:*:*

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.16:rc6:*:*:*:*:*:*

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:2.6.16:rc7:*:*:*:*:*:*

  • cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:7.0:rc1:*:*:*:*:*:*

These are NVD CPE applicability entries. Some products depend on configuration conditions; consult the official record to confirm applicability.

Advisories and references

Explore official sources

Read the official NVD record ↗

Explore the CISA catalog ↗

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