AEGLIX vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-85033
MEDIUM · CVSS 4.6 · Awaiting Analysis
Published: 2026-11-03 · Updated: 2026-11-03 · Source: NVD
Stored catalog record
Source record retrieved 2026-11-03T21:49:47.224950+00:00. Scheduled imports handle updates; this page does not assert that the provider was queried just now.
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Vulnerability overview
The AVRCP Target role in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/avrcp.c keeps its vendor-dependent response transmit state in a per-connection object selected by connection index (get_avrcp_tg()), with the per-transfer context (tid, sent_len, and the BT_AVRCP_TG_FLAG_TX_ONGOING flag) stored in the user_data of the queued response net_buf. The AVCTP teardown handler avrcp_disconnected() did not cancel tg->vd_rsp_tx_work and did not release the buffers still queued on tg->vd_rsp_tx_pending, so a link drop in the middle of a fragmented response left the buffer on the list with TX_ONGOING still set. A remote AVRCP Controller can trigger this deterministically: it issues a vendor-dependent command whose response exceeds one AVRCP fragment (for example GetElementAttributes or GetCapabilities), lets bt_avrcp_tg_vendor_tx_work() emit the START fragment, and then drops the ACL link instead of sending REQUEST_CONTINUING_RESPONSE. The AVCTP control channel requires an encrypted BR/EDR link (BT_SECURITY_L2), so the attacker must be a paired peer within radio range; no user interaction is needed. Because the Target objects are static and reused, the next connection landing on the same connection index finds the stale buffer at the head of vd_rsp_tx_pending. Every run of the TX work sees TX_ONGOING and returns immediately, so all further vendor-dependent responses queue behind the stale head and are never sent — a persistent loss of AVRCP Target function that no timeout clears and only a reboot recovers. Each cycle also leaks one response buffer from a shallow application pool, and a new peer that sends REQUEST_CONTINUING_RESPONSE clears the stale TX_ONGOING via bt_avrcp_tg_process_continuing_cmd(), causing the un-sent remainder of the previous peer's response to be transmitted to it. The fix cancels tg->vd_rsp_tx_work and unrefs every buffer on tg->vd_rsp_tx_pending in avrcp_disconnected(); since the TX context lives in the buffer user_data, releasing the buffers also resets the TX state machine. There is no memory corruption: the pre-fix buffer is leaked with a live reference, so no use-after-free arises.
Patch review priority
Assess exposure and vendor guidance
- No higher-priority signal is available in the current stored evidence.
FIRST EPSS: 0.21% · percentile 11.9 · score date 2026-11-18.
EPSS estimates probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. It does not measure your exposure or prove exploitation. The elevated threshold is 10%; CISA KEV takes precedence. About FIRST EPSS ↗
Severity and scoring
- CVSS score
- 4.6 · MEDIUM
- CVSS version
- 3.1
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:L
- Weaknesses
- CWE-459
CVSS measures technical severity; it does not establish whether this vulnerability is being exploited in your environment.
Known exploitation and remediation
Not listed in the CISA catalog retrieved for this record. This does not establish that exploitation has not occurred.
Verify affected versions and patch availability in the vendor advisory before making changes.
Affected products and versions
NVD has not supplied affected-version configurations for this record. Check the vendor references below.