AEGLIX vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-90083
UNSCORED · Received
Published: 2026-09-17 · Updated: 2026-10-30 · Source: NVD
Stored catalog record
Source record retrieved 2026-10-30T15:50:40.830049+00:00. Scheduled imports handle updates; this page does not assert that the provider was queried just now.
Continue your research
Connect this record to stored reporting, reviewed campaign mentions and source-domain investigation. These are research leads, not inferred attack relationships.
Open CVE research in Investigate · Find Arsenal listings referencing this CVE
Vulnerability overview
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net/sched: act_ife: Only operate on Ethernet frames act_ife encapsulates/decapsulates the original Ethernet header and uses skb->dev->hard_header_len as the length of that header. That is only correct for Ethernet devices: on a device where hard_header_len does not match the L2 header that was actually pulled (PPP reports PPP_HDRLEN while nothing is stripped on ingress), the ingress skb_push()/skb_pull() use the wrong length and can hit skb_under_panic when headroom is tight. IFE is Ethernet-only by design - it builds an outer ethhdr, rewrites h_source/h_dest/h_proto, and calls eth_type_trans() on decode - so instead of trying to make the offsets work for arbitrary link types, simply drop packets that do not carry an Ethernet header. Checking skb->dev->type alone is not enough. We have to cater for a corner case where mirred can redirect an skb from a non-Ethernet device to an Ethernet one, and skb->dev then says nothing about the framing the skb actually has: an skb redirected from ppp0 reaches the target's ingress hook with mac_len 0 and no Ethernet header at all. So at ingress also require mac_len to be ETH_HLEN. On egress mac_len is not maintained, so the device type is all we have; a bogus redirect there yields a malformed frame rather than an out-of-bounds push, and it would be malformed with or without IFE. That corner case is not theoretical - redirecting from ppp0 into a veth that has an ife encode action on its ingress hook panics without this patch: skbuff: skb_under_panic: len:98 put:14 head:ffff88800e410000 data:ffff88800e40fff5 tail:0x57 end:0x640 dev:veth3 kernel BUG at net/core/skbuff.c:214! Call Trace: skb_push (net/core/skbuff.c:224 net/core/skbuff.c:2657) tcf_ife_act (net/sched/act_ife.c:829 net/sched/act_ife.c:874) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) netif_receive_skb (net/core/dev.c:6463 net/core/dev.c:6522) tcf_mirred_to_dev (net/sched/act_mirred.c:248 net/sched/act_mirred.c:328) tcf_mirred_act (net/sched/act_mirred.c:489) tc_run (net/core/dev.c:4463) process_backlog (net/core/dev.c:6728) With Ethernet framing guaranteed, use ETH_HLEN instead of hard_header_len.
Patch review priority
Assess exposure and vendor guidance
- No higher-priority signal is available in the current stored evidence.
FIRST EPSS: 0.22% · percentile 12.8 · score date 2026-11-18.
EPSS estimates probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. It does not measure your exposure or prove exploitation. The elevated threshold is 10%; CISA KEV takes precedence. About FIRST EPSS ↗
Severity and scoring
- CVSS score
- Not scored · UNSCORED
- CVSS version
- Not supplied
- CVSS vector
- Not supplied
- Weaknesses
- Not supplied
CVSS measures technical severity; it does not establish whether this vulnerability is being exploited in your environment.
Known exploitation and remediation
Not listed in the CISA catalog retrieved for this record. This does not establish that exploitation has not occurred.
Verify affected versions and patch availability in the vendor advisory before making changes.
Affected products and versions
NVD has not supplied affected-version configurations for this record. Check the vendor references below.
Advisories and references
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/138b0054021fd7d57bc3eb68b3f4e2bcec037849
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/13dddf87a1f89557920f9b437a21ea0b7225f828
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3c07621770b04f19b67e3af4a24b4d447826fbdd
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/5b483f7791b079bb97d411f1066652ff659207ff
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/b951dd2fd5ede007474fc134ecb5639e1f86f5de
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d218ea7df6eba076171f2d4897a429a31f2139f0