AEGLIX vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-98643
UNSCORED · Received
Published: 2026-10-18 · Updated: 2026-10-19 · Source: NVD
Stored catalog record
Source record retrieved 2026-10-28T10:23:24.325445+00:00. Scheduled imports handle updates; this page does not assert that the provider was queried just now.
Vulnerability overview
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: bpf: Fix out-of-bounds read of rtt_min in sock_ops A sockops prog reading skops->rtt_min never checks the sk type: on the tcp_conn_request() path sock_ops->sk is a request_sock (non-full), and the ctx rewrite casts it to a tcp_sock (full) and reads rtt_min past the end of the request_sock, returning dirty adjacent memory. SEC("sockops") int prog(struct bpf_sock_ops *skops) { switch (skops->op) { case BPF_SOCK_OPS_RWND_INIT: leak = skops->rtt_min; /* reads the request_sock OOB */ ... } } For instance one such read returned rtt_min=0xffff8881, the high half of a leaked kernel pointer. Guarding that cast is exactly what SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() does -- it checks is_locked_tcp_sock and returns 0 when sock_ops->sk is not a locked full socket. Every other tcp_sock field in sock_ops goes through it; rtt_min is the only one open-coded, so it skips the check. Read rtt_min through SOCK_OPS_GET_FIELD() too. rtt_min is a bit special: it is a struct minmax and we only want the current min, so pass rtt_min.s[0].v. That is equivalent to the old hand-computed offset offsetof(struct tcp_sock, rtt_min) + sizeof_field(struct minmax_sample, t) (s[0] sits at rtt_min + 0 and .v at + sizeof(.t), i.e. what minmax_get() returns), so the loaded field is unchanged and only the full-sock guard is added. The two BUILD_BUG_ON()s that protected the hand-computed offset are no longer needed. Before patch: 0: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk 1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; ((tcp_sock *)sk)->rtt_min.s[0].v After patch: 0: *(u64 *)(r1 +56) = r9 1: r9 = *(u8 *)(r1 +50) ; is_locked_tcp_sock 2: if r9 == 0 goto pc+4 ; not a locked full sock -> 0 3: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56) 4: r1 = *(u64 *)(r1 +0) ; r1 = skops->sk 5: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 +2324) ; rtt_min.s[0].v 6: goto pc+2 7: r9 = *(u64 *)(r1 +56) 8: r1 = 0
Patch review priority
Assess exposure and vendor guidance
- No higher-priority signal is available in the current stored evidence.
FIRST EPSS: 0.21% · percentile 11.2 · score date 2026-10-27.
EPSS estimates probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. It does not measure your exposure or prove exploitation. The elevated threshold is 10%; CISA KEV takes precedence. About FIRST EPSS ↗
Severity and scoring
- CVSS score
- Not scored · UNSCORED
- CVSS version
- Not supplied
- CVSS vector
- Not supplied
- Weaknesses
- Not supplied
CVSS measures technical severity; it does not establish whether this vulnerability is being exploited in your environment.
Known exploitation and remediation
Not listed in the CISA catalog retrieved for this record. This does not establish that exploitation has not occurred.
Verify affected versions and patch availability in the vendor advisory before making changes.
Affected products and versions
NVD has not supplied affected-version configurations for this record. Check the vendor references below.
Advisories and references
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/0c796efa919f52f788c22c79d1f1b70321696b3d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3a46f14e6cf375f3ca38f8f6e6524749e24ea0a8
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/6785313d4fac96afb21ef193610c1fa88b1a9e64
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/75f8cf22463d82bb1fb0239a3d485fc8f4c8ef03
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/a8a9becbac93a9f54f4d565f1f3005eb08a7912f
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/cba54d142c43ec96d8c4d566f66439e8c0afded7
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fc9d0e6e9d86fbefe7b8fe6ee49f4cf102add79d
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fd6bf2721933d8c90bc4ce57f3e204c9295e7e3f