AEGLIX vulnerability intelligence
CVE-2026-99059
HIGH · CVSS 7.7 · Received
Published: 2026-10-23 · Updated: 2026-10-24 · Source: NVD
Stored catalog record
Source record retrieved 2026-10-28T10:20:58.124218+00:00. Scheduled imports handle updates; this page does not assert that the provider was queried just now.
Vulnerability overview
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: wireguard: noise: reject response consumption after intermediate initiation Two threads begin processing the identical response message, received twice. The first thread, A, runs. While it's running, the second one, B, gets partway through, and during that slow calculation, or even while blocking on down_write(), A completes and then also a handshake initiation that's already been queued up runs in thread C, which itself takes that same down_write(). The handshake initiation creation succeeds, and sets the state back to waiting-for-response, and calls up_write(), at which point thread B resumes, because either its finished its calculations or was finally allowed to acquire down_write(). Thread B then copies the state back to the peer, and begins a new session, using that state, which is the same session as the one made in thread A. Thread A Thread B Thread C down_read() sA = handshake->state memcpy(cA, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sA != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cA) down_read() sB = handshake->state memcpy(cB, handshake->crypto) up_read() if (sB != 1) goto fail slow_crypto(cB) down_write() if (sA != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cA) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() down_write() slow_crypto(handshake->crypto) handshake->state = 1 up_write() down_write() if (sB != handshake->state) goto fail memcpy(handshake->crypto, cB) handshake->state = 2 up_write() down_write() if (handshake->state != 2) goto fail derive_session(handshake->crypto) up_write() This seems basically impossible to hit in a meaningful way in practice, but ensure that it absolutely cannot happen by comparing the ephemeral private key that's on the stack with the latest one that the peer's handshake state has.
Patch review priority
Assess exposure and vendor guidance
- No higher-priority signal is available in the current stored evidence.
FIRST EPSS: 0.44% · percentile 38.4 · score date 2026-10-27.
EPSS estimates probability of exploitation in the next 30 days. It does not measure your exposure or prove exploitation. The elevated threshold is 10%; CISA KEV takes precedence. About FIRST EPSS ↗
Severity and scoring
- CVSS score
- 7.7 · HIGH
- CVSS version
- 3.1
- CVSS vector
- CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:L
- Weaknesses
- Not supplied
CVSS measures technical severity; it does not establish whether this vulnerability is being exploited in your environment.
Known exploitation and remediation
Not listed in the CISA catalog retrieved for this record. This does not establish that exploitation has not occurred.
Verify affected versions and patch availability in the vendor advisory before making changes.
Affected products and versions
NVD has not supplied affected-version configurations for this record. Check the vendor references below.
Advisories and references
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/3bec3d32c2a3afd164fc87f95457df2cf9049c20
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/4d64a3d6e96aa78619c9c29ffde309794974588a
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/c76a80db593096edf2b3b3972f58b6342a8c6c04
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/d0305f8d90029556260c6824b61c493c424eba9e
- https://git.kernel.org/stable/c/fb5ce4c7790c3eeec820302d08d70ecf46af4295